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Abstract 18 
In Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) schemes, Carbon Dioxide (CO2) is captured 19 
from large scale industrial emitters and transported to geological sites for storage. The most 20 
efficient method for the transportation of CO2 is via pipeline in the dense phase. CO2 is a 21 
hazardous substance which, in the unlikely event of an accidental release, could cause 22 
people harm. To correspond with United Kingdom (UK) safety legislation, the design and 23 
construction of proposed CO2 pipelines requires compliance with recognised pipeline codes. 24 
The UK code PD-8010-1 defines the separation distance between a hazardous pipeline and a 25 
nearby population as the minimum distance to occupied buildings using a substance factor. 26 
The value of the substance factor should be supported by the results of a Quantitative Risk 27 
Assessment (QRA) approach to ensure the safe design, construction and operation of a 28 
dense phase CO2 pipeline. 29 
Failure frequency models are a major part of this QRA approach and the focus of this paper 30 
is a review of existing oil and gas pipeline third-party external interference failure frequency 31 
models to assess whether they could be applied to dense phase CO2 pipelines. It was found 32 
that the high design pressure requirement for a dense phase CO2 pipeline typically 33 
necessitates the use of high wall thickness linepipe in pipeline construction; and that the 34 
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wall thickness of typical dense phase CO2 pipelines is beyond the known range of 35 
applicability for the pipeline failure equations used within existing failure frequency models. 36 
Furthermore, even though third party external interference failure frequency is not sensitive 37 
to the product that a pipeline transports, there is however a limitation to the application of 38 
existing UK fault databases with to onshore CO2 pipelines as there are currently no dense 39 
phase CO2 pipelines operating in the UK. Further work needs to be conducted to confirm the 40 
most appropriate approach for calculating failure frequency for dense phase CO2 pipelines, 41 
and it is recommended that a new failure frequency model suitable for dense phase CO2 42 
pipelines is developed that can be readily updated to the latest version of the fault 43 
database. 44 
 45 
1. Introduction 46 
Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) is recognised by the United Kingdom (UK) 47 
Government (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017) as one of a suite 48 
of solutions required to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into the atmosphere and 49 
prevent catastrophic global climate change. In CCUS schemes, CO2 is captured from large scale 50 
industrial emitters and transported, predominantly by pipeline, to geological sites, such as 51 
depleted oil or gas fields or saline aquifers, where it is injected into rock formations for 52 
storage. 53 
The most efficient method for the transportation of CO2 is via pipeline in the dense phase, i.e. 54 
above the critical pressure but below the critical temperature. This is because, in the dense 55 
phase, CO2 has the density of a liquid but the viscosity and compressibility of a gas (Downie, 56 
Race and Seevam, 2007). The presence of impurities in the captured CO2 will affect the critical 57 
temperature and pressure (Wetenhall, Race and Downie, 2014), and pipelines transporting 58 
this CO2 may require operating pressures in excess of 150 barg to ensure single phase flow 59 
(Noothout et al, 2014). 60 
The National Grid COOLTRANS (CO2Liquid pipeline TRANSportation) research programme 61 
(Cooper and Barnett, 2014a) was carried out to address knowledge gaps in the design, 62 
construction and operation of dense phase CO2 pipelines in the UK. The aim of the programme 63 
was to develop a comprehensive Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methodology for dense 64 
phase CO2 pipelines, which could be used in routeing and design studies to ensure that the 65 
risk level from the CO2 pipeline is as low as reasonably practicable in accordance with UK 66 
legislation. Calculation of failure frequency is an important part of a pipeline QRA and failure 67 
frequencies from all possible failure causes must be determined including corrosion, ground 68 
movement, mechanical and third party external interference. As part of the COOLTRANS 69 
research programme, a review was conducted to ascertain the technical basis and data on 70 
which existing models are used to calculate failure frequency due to third-party external 71 
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interference and to evaluate the suitability of the models for use as part of a QRA 72 
methodology for dense phase CO2 pipelines. This paper documents part of the review. 73 
 74 
2. The Requirement for a Failure Frequency Model for Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines 75 
Being toxic, CO2 is a hazardous substance, which in the unlikely event of an accidental release, 76 
could cause harm to people. To comply with UK safety legislation, the design and construction 77 
of proposed CO2 pipelines requires compliance with recognised pipeline codes. Given that 78 
there are CO2 pipelines operating in the US (Knoope et al., 2014), it may be desirable to adopt 79 
the United States (US) code for use in the UK. In the US, CO2 pipelines are designed, 80 
constructed and operated in accordance with the US Federal Code of Regulations, Title 49, 81 
Volume 3, Part 195 - Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline and the associate 82 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards B31.4 and B31.8. However, 83 
according to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidance (HSE, 2008), there are specific 84 
issues that prevent the adoption of the US pipeline codes within the UK. Firstly, the US code 85 
of regulations applies only to pipelines transporting CO2 in the supercritical phase and 86 
therefore may not be completely relevant to pipelines conveying dense phase CO2, i.e. a 87 
subcooled liquid. Secondly, the standard for gas transportation, ASME B31.8, specifically 88 
excludes pipelines carrying CO2 (in any phase), and whilst the standard for liquid 89 
transportation, ASME B31.4, does not exclude pipelines transporting CO2, it does not include 90 
CO2 on the list of fluids for which the code is intended to apply. It was therefore concluded by 91 
the UK HSE guidance (2008) that there may be limited technical benefit in adopting US codes 92 
or standards, either in their entirety or in part, for CO2 pipeline design and construction in the 93 
UK. 94 
For the above reasons, it is required that the UK pipeline design code be modified in order to 95 
account for the pipelines transporting dense phase CO2. The UK code PD 8010: Part-1 defines 96 
the separation distance between a hazardous pipeline and a nearby population as the 97 
minimum distance to occupied buildings (MDOB) using a substance factor which gives 98 
cautious estimates of the MDOB according to the hazardous nature of the substance (BSI, 99 
2015). The value of the substance factor should be supported by reference to joint industry 100 
or project specific research and guidance on the routeing of pipelines conveying CO2 (Cooper 101 
and Barnett, 2014b). A QRA approach, which involves the numerical estimation of risk from a 102 
calculation of the frequencies and consequences of a complete and representative set of 103 
credible accident scenarios, is therefore required to ensure the safe design, construction and 104 
operation of a dense phase CO2 pipeline. 105 
The procedure for conducting a risk assessment for pipelines carrying flammable fluids, is well 106 
established and embedded in industry guidance and codes of practice. Recommended QRA 107 
methodologies based on best practice are published in the supporting Institution of Gas 108 
Engineers and Managers (IGEM) standard IGEM/TD/2 (IGEM, 2008) and British Standards 109 
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Institution code PD 8010: Part-3 (BSI, 2013). The code PD 8010: Part-3 notes that while the 110 
QRA methodology addresses thermal hazards only, its principles can also be applied to toxic 111 
hazards. 112 
The purpose of a CO2 pipeline QRA is to determine the risks posed by the pipeline to people 113 
located nearby. The procedure involves the identification of hazard scenarios and considers 114 
both the probability and consequences of failure in order to calculate values for the individual 115 
and societal risks. The QRA process is outlined by the flow chart in Figure 1, indicated by the 116 
shaded boxes on the left hand side of the chart. This chart has been adapted from Figure 3 of 117 
PD 8010: Part-3 (BSI, 2013) by modifying the consequence calculations to make them 118 
appropriate for a toxic, rather than flammable fluid. The probability of failure is calculated 119 
through determination of the failure frequencies for all credible threats to the pipeline. The 120 
consequences of failure are calculated by considering the dose of CO2 which an individual may 121 
be subjected to following a pipeline release. The consequences of failure therefore require 122 
prediction of the dispersion behaviour of a cloud of CO2 following release. The consequence 123 
modelling has been extensively researched (Molag and Dam, 2011; Koornneef et al., 2009), 124 
however far less work has been published regarding CO2 pipeline failure frequencies. 125 
 126 
Figure 1: – Risk calculation flow chart for CO2 pipelines 127 
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CO2 pipeline failure can occur due to numerous different mechanisms including third party 128 
external interference, corrosion (internal and external), material and construction defects, 129 
natural events such as ground movement and other causes such as fatigue; all of which must 130 
be considered as part of the assessment (Goodfellow, 2006). This paper focuses on third party 131 
external interference for two reasons; firstly, accidental or intentional human actions are one 132 
of the main causes of pipeline failures (Cooper and Barnett, 2014b); and secondly this damage 133 
cause may be random and is typically outside of the direct control of the pipeline operator. 134 
External interference of a pipeline by a third party can result in mechanical damage to that 135 
pipeline, which can occur in the form of dents, gouges, a combination of dents and gouges 136 
and punctures. A dent will cause an area of local stress concentration and is a deformation of 137 
the wall of the pipeline as shown in Figure 2, where D is the pipeline external diameter; H is 138 
the depth of dent in the pipeline and t is the pipeline wall thickness. A gouge is a defect which 139 
is defined by a loss of material from the pipe wall and is illustrated in Figure 3, where c is half 140 
of the axial defect length; d is defect depth. A gouged dent (see Figure 4) is a combination of 141 
both a dent defect and a gouge defect. Third party interference can also result in damage to 142 
branches and fittings on a pipeline; failure can occur if these attachments are severely 143 
damaged or severed from the pipeline. From a risk assessment point of view, the most 144 
important factor in pipeline failure is whether the failure will occur as a leak or as a rupture. 145 
A leak is defined as a failure which is stable. A rupture is defined as a failure which is unstable 146 
and is significantly worse than a leak in consequence terms. 147 
Figure 2: A representation of a pipeline dent 148 
 149 
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Figure 3: A representation of a pipeline gouge 150 
Figure 4: A representation of a gouged dent 151 
 152 
Third party external interference failure frequency models have been used in the oil and gas 153 
pipeline industry for over 25 years. Given the principles of containment, stress and fracture, 154 
and that all high-pressure pipelines are constructed using steel, third party external 155 
interference failure frequency, is not sensitive to the product that a pipeline transports. 156 
Indeed Parfomak and Fogler (2007) proposed that ‘statistically, the number of incidents 157 
involving CO2 pipelines should be similar to those for natural gas transmission pipelines’. Thus, 158 
the models used to calculate third party external interference failure frequency for oil and gas 159 
pipelines may also be applicable to dense phase CO2 pipelines. This study is intended to 160 
review the current pipeline failure frequency models and assesses whether they may be 161 
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extended to calculate pipeline failure frequency due to third party external interference for 162 
dense phase CO2 pipelines. 163 
3. Overview of Existing Failure Frequency Models 164 
For oil and gas pipelines, the frequency of pipeline failure due to third party external 165 
interference has traditionally been calculated using models based upon probabilistic, 166 
structural reliability methods. They are applied by combining the following: 167 
 Limit state functions which are mathematical models which define the conditions for 168 
failure (discussed in Section 3.1); 169 
 Probability distributions of selected random variables based on historical data 170 
(discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and 171 
 A mathematical technique to calculate the probability of failure (e.g. Numerical 172 
Integration, Monte Carlo, First Order Reliability Methods). 173 
For pipelines, the limit state functions are based on semi-empirical fracture mechanics failure 174 
equations; and the probability distributions are based on pipeline damage from historical 175 
operational data. Failure probability is converted into failure frequency to take into account 176 
the regularity of third party external interference damage.  177 
3.1. Limit State Functions 178 
The limit state functions define the conditions for failure in terms of the size of the defect, 179 
the pipeline geometry, and the material properties of the linepipe steel. They are based upon 180 
empirical or semi-empirical fracture mechanics failure equations for the failure of defects in 181 
linepipe. 182 
For all failure frequency models, separate limit state functions are required to describe the 183 
following: 184 
 Leak / rupture 185 
 Gouge failure 186 
 Gouged dent failure 187 
The failure frequency models reviewed in this paper use limit state functions based on the 188 
flow stress dependent form of the through-wall NG-18 equation (Kiefner, Maxey, Eiber and 189 
Duffy, 1973) to determine whether damage will fail as a leak or rupture, the flow stress 190 
dependent form of the part-wall NG-18 equation (Kiefner, Maxey, Eiber and Duffy, 1973) to 191 
determine whether a gouge will fail and the British Gas Dent-Gouge Fracture Model 192 
(BGDGFM) (Hopkins, 1992) to determine whether a gouged dent will fail. 193 
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 194 
3.1.1. The NG-18 Equations 195 
The NG-18 equations were developed by the Battelle Memorial Institute in the 1970s 196 
(Cosham, 2002) and because of their accuracy and simplicity they have become accepted as 197 
the industry standard for defect assessment, have been included as part of defect assessment 198 
codes and have been used extensively since their introduction. The equations are semi-199 
empirical and are based upon the Dugdale (1960) strip-yield model and a series of full scale 200 
experimental burst tests of vessels with through-wall and part-wall defects (Cosham, 2002). 201 
Based upon the operating conditions of a pipeline, the through-wall NG-18 equation is used 202 
to determine whether an axially oriented through-wall defect will lead to a full-bore rupture 203 
or remain as a leak while the part-wall NG-18 equation is used to determine whether an axially 204 
oriented part-wall defect (i.e. a gouge) will progress into a through-wall defect. 205 
Both the through-wall and the part-wall NG-18 equations exist in two forms: toughness 206 
dependent and flow stress dependent. Flow stress is a measure of the stress at which 207 
unconstrained plastic flow occurs. In the failure frequency models, the flow stress dependent 208 
form of the through-wall and part-wall NG-18 equations is used over the toughness 209 
dependent form due to the high toughness of modern steels used for linepipe. The flow stress 210 
was empirically determined from a series of full scale burst tests of vessels. 211 
               212 
3.1.2. The British Gas Dent Gouge Fracture Model (BGDGFM) 213 
The BGDGFM is used to determine, based upon the current operating conditions of the 214 
pipeline, whether a part-wall gouged dent defect will progress into a through-wall defect. 215 
Assuming that part-wall gouged dent failure occurs due to a combination of brittle fracture 216 
and plastic collapse, the BGDGFM was developed by British Gas in the early 1980s (Cosham, 217 
2001). It is semi-empirical and is based upon a modified version of the Dugdale strip-yield 218 
model and series of experimental ring and vessel tests with artificial gouged dent defects 219 
created at zero pressure. 220 
The BGDGFM was calibrated using experimental tests for which the gouged dent damage was 221 
created and measured in an unpressurised pipeline.It is noted that the BGDGFM assumes the 222 
gouge is of infinite length and gouge length is not explicably included. 223 
3.2 Incident Rates 224 
The frequency with which a pipeline is subject to a gouge or gouged dent is known as an 225 
incident rate and is based upon historical data. In the UK, this historical database is the United 226 
Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators’ Association (UKOPA) Fault Database (Cosham, 2007) 227 
which is subject to an annual update to include new data. The UKOPA database includes data 228 
9 
 
from the Engineering Research Station (ERS) Fault Database, a database encompassing all of 229 
the transmission pipelines in the onshore gas transmission system in the UK. The database 230 
records details of all known pipeline faults and failures, which were subject to an excavation 231 
and on-site assessment, from 2016 dating back to 1962.  232 
 233 
An Incident-Rate value is derived from the number of third party external interference 234 
mechanical damage incidents and a value for operational exposure. This is then used, 235 
alongside the probability of failure, to calculate the total failure frequency rate.  236 
 237 
3.3 Probability Distributions and Calculating the Probability of Failure 238 
The failure frequency models described in this paper use random variables in the calculation 239 
of the probability of failure. These variables appear in the limit state functions as, for example, 240 
gouge length, gouge depth or gouge dent depth. The majority of the failure frequency models 241 
reviewed here use fitted Weibull cumulative probability distributions to describe the random 242 
variables. The Weibull distributions were fitted based on pipeline damage data and were 243 
chosen due to their versatility in allowing a wide variety of physical quantities to be accurately 244 
represented. 245 
In a failure frequency model the cumulative distribution functions for each random damage 246 
variable then allow the probability of a gouge or gouged dent damage of a certain size or 247 
greater to be calculated using numerical integration or by statistical methods. The total failure 248 
frequency can then be calculated by combining the probability of failure with the incident 249 
rate. 250 
4. Review of Existing Failure Frequency Models 251 
The various models currently in use within the oil and natural gas pipeline industry differ in 252 
their subtleties; however all are based upon a methodology originally developed by British 253 
Gas. They are briefly described in the following sub-sections starting with the British Gas 254 
Engineering Research Station (ERS) Hazard Analysis Model. 255 
4.1. The British Gas ERS Hazard Analysis Model 256 
A model to calculate pipeline failure frequency due to third party external interference was 257 
developed at the British Gas ERS in the 1980s. The model uses a combination of structural 258 
reliability methods and trends derived from historical operational data to calculate a value for 259 
failure frequency. Failure frequency is calculated for a user defined pipeline based upon its 260 
diameter, wall thickness, operating pressure, steel grade, fracture toughness and area type 261 
(Matthews, 1984; Corder, 1985a; Corder, 1985b; Corder, 1986). 262 
4.1.1. Hazard Analysis Model Structural Reliability Component and Limit States 263 
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The structural reliability based component of the Hazard Analysis model considers the failure 264 
of part-wall damage and through-wall punctures. In this part of the model, pipeline failure is 265 
considered to occur via one of three damage failure mechanisms: 266 
 Failure of a gouge. 267 
 Failure of a gouged dent. 268 
 Direct breach of a pipe wall. 269 
In the model, pipeline failure frequency is therefore dependent on: 270 
 271 
 The frequency with which a pipeline is subjected to a gouge; 272 
 The frequency with which a pipeline is subjected to a gouged dent; 273 
 The probability of failure of a gouge; and 274 
 The probability of failure of a gouged dent. 275 
Additionally, the model considers that pipeline failure will result in either a leak or a rupture. 276 
 277 
The limit state functions used in the Hazard Analysis model define the conditions for failure 278 
in terms of the size of the defect, the pipeline geometry and the material properties of the 279 
linepipe steel. In order to determine whether damage will fail as a leak or rupture, a critical 280 
defect length is defined using the flow stress dependent form of the through-wall NG-18 281 
equation. In order to determine whether a gouge will fail, a critical gouge depth is defined 282 
using the flow stress dependent form of the part-wall NG-18 equation (Kiefner, Maxey, Eiber 283 
and Duffy, 1973). In order to determine whether a gouged dent will fail, a critical dent depth 284 
is defined using the BGDGFM (Hopkins, 1992). 285 
 286 
4.1.1.1. Hazard Analysis Model Incident Rates 287 
In the Hazard Analysis model four different incident rates are used. In addition to the different 288 
values required for gouges and gouged dents, the incident rates are also split depending on 289 
whether the land through which a pipeline is routed is rural (R-type) or suburban (S-type) as 290 
different machinery operating in different areas produced different damage profiles. The 291 
incident rates are based upon an analysis of the ERS Fault Database.  292 
 293 
4.1.1.2. Hazard Analysis Model Probability Distributions 294 
The Hazard Analysis model uses six random variables to describe the size of the gouge or dent 295 
defect within the limit state functions: Gouge Length, Gouged Dent Gouge Length, Gouge 296 
Depth in Rural Type Areas, Gouge Depth in Suburban Type Areas, Gouged Dent Gouge Depth 297 
and Gouged Dent Depth. Six separate Weibull probability distributions were derived to 298 
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describe the six random variables using defect size data from the ERS Fault Database. All of 299 
the other variables, describing pipeline geometry and material properties, in the limit state 300 
functions were assumed to be deterministic quantities. 301 
4.1.1.3. Hazard Analysis Model Probability of Failure of a Gouge and a Gouged Dent 302 
The probability and frequency of failure for gouge and gouged dent damage in the Hazard 303 
Analysis model are calculated using numerical integration with the trapezium rule (Matthews, 304 
1984; Corder, 1985a). However, it is noted that the gouge length Weibull distribution was 305 
truncated at 1,397 mm. The leak, rupture and total failure frequency are then calculated by 306 
combining the incident rate with the probability of failure. 307 
4.1.2. Hazard Analysis Model Historical Data Component 308 
The historical data component of the Hazard Analysis model considers through-wall damage 309 
only. In this part of the model, a value for failure frequency is determined for failures resulting 310 
from damage to branches and fittings on the pipeline. The failure frequency is determined 311 
directly from historical operational data for failures of this type contained in the ERS Fault 312 
Database. The overall leak, rupture and total failure frequency are calculated by combining 313 
the results from the structural reliability component and the historical data component. 314 
 315 
4.1.3. Summary of Hazard Analysis Model 316 
The Hazard Analysis model uses the combination of a structural reliability component 317 
(including the NG-18 Equations and BGDGFM) and an historical data component. Developed 318 
in the 1980s, it uses the old ERS Fault Database and has been replaced by other models 319 
described in the following sections. 320 
4.2. FFREQ 321 
FFREQ is the current UK pipeline industry standard model for calculating pipeline failure 322 
frequency due to third party external interference. The model was developed by British Gas 323 
as an update to the Hazard Analysis model described in Section 4.1 (Corder, 1993; Corder, 324 
1995) and exists in the form of a software package. As with Hazard Analysis, FFREQ uses the 325 
combination of a structural reliability component and an historical data component in order 326 
to calculate a value for failure frequency. Certain modifications and augmentations were 327 
made to the failure frequency calculation methodology used in Hazard Analysis in order to 328 
produce FFREQ, but these were poorly documented. 329 
This model offers comprehensive features and includes additional functionality to take into 330 
account the resistance of pipes to denting, the pipeline depth cover (pipelines that are buried 331 
deeply are less prone to damage) and the option to include a sleeve (an additional layer of 332 
protection) analysis. However, users do not have access to the FFREQ source code and can 333 
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only enter input data and receive an output. This was compounded by the lack of definitive 334 
documentation as to the exact content of the model. It is therefore not possible to determine 335 
the exact changes made between Hazard Analysis and FFREQ. However, the limit state 336 
functions used are identical to those used in the Hazard Analysis model (Corder, 1993; Corder, 337 
1995) meaning that the structural analysis in FFREQ is based on the NG-18 Equations and the 338 
BGDGFM. 339 
4.3. PIPIN 340 
PIPeline INtegrity model (PIPIN) is the model used by the HSE to determine failure frequencies 341 
for the four largest causes of failure (construction defects, natural events, corrosion and third 342 
party external interference), for a user defined pipeline. The model was developed for the 343 
HSE by W.S. Atkins in the late 1990s (HSE, 2003). Certain elements of the PIPIN model are 344 
based upon the pipeline failure frequency methodology developed by British Gas and used in 345 
the Hazard Analysis model. However, due to differences in application; changes to the 346 
methodology; and updated statistics, the PIPIN and Hazard Analysis models appear notably 347 
different to each other. In PIPIN, the structural reliability component and the historical data 348 
component are completely distinct and produce failure frequency values relating to different 349 
causes. Failure frequencies for construction defects, natural events and corrosion are 350 
determined using the historical data component. The structural reliability component of PIPIN 351 
is directly analogous to the structural reliability component of the Hazard Analysis model and 352 
is used to calculate the failure frequencies for third party external interference. Failure stress 353 
is determined by the NG-18 Equation. For the gouged dent limit state function, PIPIN uses a 354 
limit state function based on the Dugdale strip-yield model (as in the BGDGFM model). Like 355 
FFREQ, the PIPIN model includes the effect of depth of cover. 356 
When compared with other models, there are many unique features to the PIPIN model. 357 
Firstly, the limit state function for leak/rupture is defined using the British Energy R6 rev. 3 358 
assessment procedure (Milne, Ainsworth, Dowling and Stewart, 1988) and this introduces a 359 
brittle fracture component to the failure; secondly, additional distributions are used to 360 
describe uncertainty in parameters such as the pipeline diameter, wall thickness and the limit 361 
state functions themselves in an attempt to produce a more realistic representation of failure 362 
frequency; and finally, the probability and frequency of failure for gouges and gouged dents 363 
in PIPIN are calculated using the Monte Carlo method. Like FFREQ, PIPIN also includes 364 
additional functionality to take into account the resistance of pipes to denting. 365 
However, there is some uncertainty regarding the use of operational data within the PIPIN 366 
model. For example it is not clear, whether data from both S-type and R-type areas in the 367 
UKOPA Fault Database were included in the derivation of the PIPIN gouge depth distribution; 368 
the source of the random variable distributions for the limit state functions; and how data 369 
regarding punctures and failure from damage to branches and fittings were treated in the 370 
derivation of the damage dimension distributions. 371 
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4.4. PIE 372 
In the 20 year period since the development of the Hazard Analysis model, FFREQ had been 373 
widely adopted within the pipeline industry to calculate third party external interference 374 
failure frequencies for QRA. The reliance on FFREQ however raised concern, given the 375 
somewhat opaque nature of the model. It was also felt that since FFREQ was developed in 376 
1993, there existed many years of additional operational data, which could be used to provide 377 
updated and more accurate probability distributions and incident rates. To address this, the 378 
PIE model was developed by Pipeline Integrity Engineers (PIE) in 2006 (Lyons, 2006; Haswell, 379 
2008; Lyons, 2008) as a reproduction of the failure frequency methodology from the Hazard 380 
Analysis model. The model was developed for UKOPA in order to address the above issues, 381 
and to investigate and understand the impact of pipeline parameters on failure frequency 382 
due to external interference, and the significance of the damage data recorded in the UKOPA 383 
Pipeline Fault Database.  384 
The PIE model was developed using the original documentation relating to the development 385 
of the Hazard Analysis model, in addition to the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database. Although the 386 
model was an attempt to directly reproduce the Hazard Analysis model with updated 387 
operational data, it is somewhat simplified in comparison. In particular, the model does not 388 
include an historical data component. The six random variables from the Hazard Analysis 389 
model were consolidated in the PIE model with data from both gouges and gouged dents 390 
being used together to derive single distributions for gouge depth and gouge length 391 
distributions and no distinctions are made between data from S-type and R-type areas. 392 
Additionally, the incident rate also makes no distinction between gouges and gouged dents. 393 
4.5. Cosham Model 394 
In 2007, UKOPA commissioned a study to investigate “risk reduction factors”, which were 395 
included in the pipeline integrity management code supplement PD 8010: Part-3 (BSI, 2013). 396 
As part of this study a probabilistic model was developed, hereafter referred to as the 397 
“Cosham model”, which could be used to calculate the probability of failure of a pipeline due 398 
to mechanical damage. This model was used to determine probabilistic risk reduction factor 399 
values which could then be compared with the deterministic values included in the code 400 
(Cosham, 2007). 401 
The Cosham model is based upon the Hazard Analysis Model and its limit state functions are 402 
almost identical to those used in the Hazard Analysis Model (it uses different coefficient 403 
values). However, it does not calculate the pipeline failure frequency as with the other models 404 
reviewed; instead it is concerned only with the probability of failure and it uses direct 405 
integration rather than numerical integration to produce its output. Additionally, the model 406 
does not include an historical data component, basing its output entirely on structural 407 
reliability methods. Like FFREQ, the Cosham model considers the resistance of pipes to 408 
denting, and also includes a relationship to account for the “re-rounding” effect of internal 409 
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pressure.  Similar to the PIE model, the Cosham model uses consolidated damage variables 410 
which make no distinction between gouge and gouged dent damage in terms of the gouge 411 
length and gouge depth, or between S and R area types. 412 
4.6. Penspen Damage Distributions Update 413 
The development and publication of the PIE model instigated a discussion within UKOPA 414 
regarding future recommendations on models to calculate pipeline failure frequency due to 415 
third party external interference. UKOPA ultimately decided that FFREQ would remain the 416 
recommended model for use in the industry. It was acknowledged however, that updates of 417 
the incident rates and probability distributions used in FFREQ were required to take account 418 
of more recent operational data; and that these updates should be continuous and take place 419 
on a regular basis. In 2010 UKOPA commissioned Penspen to update the probability 420 
distributions and incident rates for FFREQ (Goodfellow, 2012) using the most up to date data 421 
(as of 2009). 422 
Despite the fact that the motivation for the study was to provide an update to FFREQ, the 423 
probability distributions and incident rate derived by Penspen are actually more suited to the 424 
simplified nature of the PIE model. The variables make no distinction between gouge and 425 
gouged dent damage in terms of the gouge length and gouge depth, or between S and R area 426 
types. Additionally, the incident rate makes no distinction between gouges and gouged dents. 427 
5. Comparison of Existing Failure Frequency Models 428 
All of the existing failure frequency models are rooted in probabilistic, structural reliability 429 
methods. The models use similar or identical semi-empirical fracture mechanics failure 430 
equations to define limit state functions and probability distributions based on historical 431 
operational pipeline damage data. Some have augmented their structural reliability 432 
procedure with an additional historical data component. 433 
The majority of the models use the same failure equations for the limit state functions, 434 
namely the NG-18 equations for leak/rupture and gouge failure, and the BGDGFM for gouged 435 
dent failure. The one exception to this is the PIPIN model, which uses the British Energy R6 436 
rev. 3 assessment procedure. It can be shown however, that the methods used in this 437 
procedure are very similar to those of the BGDGFM. 438 
In terms of operational data, each model has used the most up to date version of the 439 
UKOPA/ERS Fault database available at the time of the model’s construction. Models 440 
produced later therefore include all of the operational data from the earlier models 441 
supplemented by data from the additional years of pipeline operation. 442 
Despite the similarities between the models noted above, each model is constructed in its 443 
own individual way with different choices having been made regarding failure modelling and 444 
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data manipulation. Based on the relative merits of these choices, each model can be 445 
considered to have its own advantages.  446 
It is important to note that the structural reliability methods used in the failure frequency 447 
models are not dependent upon pipeline wall thickness or any other quantity related to the 448 
transportation of dense phase CO2 by pipelines. The methods themselves are non-specific and 449 
are used for a wide variety of applications throughout engineering. The applicability of a 450 
structural reliability method to any given situation depends entirely upon the applicability of 451 
the models and data contained within them.  452 
6. Applicability of Existing Failure Frequency Models to Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines 453 
In order to ascertain the applicability of existing failure frequency models to dense phase CO2 454 
pipelines, firstly, the minimum required wall thicknesses for different dense phase CO2 455 
pipeline designs was estimated. Then the applicability of existing failure frequency models is 456 
discussed in terms of whether their structural reliability methods and historical data meet the 457 
design requirements of typical dense phase CO2 pipelines. 458 
6.1. Minimum Required Wall Thickness Estimations for Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines 459 
It is important to estimate the minimum required wall thicknesses for different dense phase 460 
CO2 pipeline designs scenarios in order to understand whether they could potentially be 461 
outside the range of applicability of current failure frequency models. The minimum required 462 
wall thicknesses can be calculated using the following thin wall formula for allowable hoop 463 
stress in PD 8010: Part-1 (BSI, 2015): 464 
 𝜎𝐻 =
𝑃𝐷
20𝑡
≤ 𝑒 𝑎𝜎𝑆𝑀𝑌𝑆 (1) 
where P is internal pressure, 𝐷is outside diameter, 𝑡 is wall thickness, e is the weld factor 465 
(assumed to be 1), a is the design factor and 𝜎𝑆𝑀𝑌𝑆  is the Specified Minimum Yield Stress 466 
(SMYS). 467 
CO2 pipeline data (Noothout et al, 2014) from existing projects indicates that the minimum 468 
operational pressure may exceed 150 barg. Assuming typical CO2 pipelines with diameters of 469 
610mm (24’’) and 914mm (36’’), and a maximum operational pressure of 150 barg, the 470 
minimum required wall thicknesses are calculated using formula (10) for different materials 471 
(API 5L X52, X65 and X80) with different design factors (0.3, 0.5 and 0.72) and are listed in 472 
Table 2. The range is in line with data from existing UK projects such as the White Rose project 473 
which proposed an onshore pipeline with 610 mm (24”) outside diameter, carbon steel grade 474 
L450/(X65) and 19.1 mm minimum wall thickness (White Rose, 2016). 475 
 476 
 477 
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 478 
P D 
API 5L 
Material SMYS 
Design 
factor 
‘a’ 
Weld 
factor 
‘e’ 
Maximum 
Hoop 
Stress 
e.a.σSMYS 
Minimum 
Wall 
Thickness ‘t’ 
(bar) (mm)  (N/mm
2)   (N/mm
2) (mm) 
150 610 X52 360 0.3 1 108 42 
150 610 X52 360 0.5 1 180 25 
150 610 X52 360 0.72 1 259.2 20 
150 610 X65 450 0.3 1 135 36 
150 610 X65 450 0.5 1 225 22.2 
150 610 X65 450 0.72 1 324 14.2 
150 610 X80 555 0.3 1 166.5 27 
150 610 X80 555 0.5 1 277.5 17.5 
150 610 X80 555 0.72 1 399.6 12.5 
150 914 X52 360 0.3 1 108 63 
150 914 X52 360 0.5 1 180 40 
150 914 X52 360 0.72 1 259.2 28.0 
150 914 X65 450 0.3 1 135 51 
150 914 X65 450 0.5 1 225 32 
150 914 X65 450 0.72 1 324 22.2 
150 914 X80 555 0.3 1 166.5 41 
150 914 X80 555 0.5 1 277.5 25 
150 914 X80 555 0.72 1 399.6 17.5 
Table 2: Estimation of the minimum required CO2 pipeline wall thicknesses 479 
In the following sections these wall thicknesses will be used to illustrate the applicability of 480 
the components making up current failure frequency (and hence the models themselves) to 481 
dense phase typical CO2 pipelines. 482 
6.2. The Range of Applicability of the NG-18 Equations 483 
Being semi-empirical, the NG-18 equations were calibrated using experimental tests of 484 
vessels with through-wall and part-wall defects. The range of applicability of each equation 485 
with regards to wall thickness can be inferred from the range of vessel wall thicknesses used 486 
in the corresponding set of burst tests used to derive it. 487 
The through-wall NG-18 equations were calibrated using the results of 92 burst tests on 488 
vessels with axially orientated, artificially machined, through-wall defects while the part-wall 489 
NG-18 equations were calibrated using the results of 48 burst tests on vessels with axially 490 
orientated, artificially machined, part-wall defects (v-shaped notches). The tests were carried 491 
out by Battelle between 1965 and 1974. The range of experimental parameters for the 492 
through-wall and the part-wall tests is shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively (Cosham, 2002). 493 
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Parameter Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 167.6 1219.2 
Wall Thickness (mm) 4.9 21.9 
Grade (API 5L) A X100 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 220.6 735.0 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 337.9 908.1 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 13.6 90.9 
Defect Length (2c) (mm) 25.4 508.0 
Burst Pressure (Nmm-2) 2.21 18.69 
Burst Stress (Nmm-2) 97.9 486.8 
Burst Stress (% Yield) 22.6 135.8 
Table 3: Battelle through-wall defect burst test parameter ranges 494 
Parameter Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 406.4 1066.8 
Wall Thickness (mm) 6.4 15.6 
Grade (API 5L) X52 X65 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 379.2 509.5 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 483.3 633.7 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 13.6 46.1 
Defect Length (2c) (mm) 63.5 609.6 
Defect Depth (d) (mm) 3.1 11.2 
Burst Pressure (Nmm-2) 1.84 12.4 
Burst Stress (Nmm-2) 61.4 506.1 
Burst Stress (% Yield) 13.7 132.5 
Table 4: Battelle part-wall defect burst test parameter ranges 495 
The parameter ranges in Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that the through-wall NG-18 equations 496 
are applicable to pipelines with a wall thickness between 4.9 mm and 21.9 mm and the part-497 
wall NG-18 equations are applicable to pipelines with a wall thickness between 6.4 mm and 498 
15.6 mm.  499 
6.3. The Range of Applicability of the British Gas Dent-Gouge Fracture Model 500 
The BGDGFM is also semi-empirical and it was calibrated using the experimental results of 501 
111 ring and 21 vessel tests with artificial gouged dent defects created at zero pressure. The 502 
tests were carried out by British Gas in 1982. The range of applicability of the BGDGFM with 503 
regards to wall thickness can be inferred from the range of wall thicknesses used in the 504 
experimental tests to derive it. The range of experimental parameters for the tests is shown 505 
in Table 5 (Cosham, 2001): 506 
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Parameter Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 323.9 1066.8 
Wall Thickness (mm) 6.6 16.4 
Grade (API 5L) X42 X65 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 348.2 522.6 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 494.0 577.8 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 15.0 70.5 
Dent Depth (H) (mm) 1.9 77.7 
Gouge Depth (d) (mm) 0.2 7.9 
Burst Stress (% Yield) 7.1 144.9 
Table 5: British Gas gouged dent ring and burst test parameter ranges 507 
The parameter ranges in Table 5 suggest that the BGDGFM is applicable to pipelines with a 508 
wall thickness between 6.6 mm and 16.4 mm. 509 
6.4. Summary of the Range of Applicability of the Failure Models 510 
On the basis of the experimental test data used in their derivation, the upper limit for validity 511 
of the NG-18 equations is 21.9 mm for through-wall defects and 15.6 mm for part-wall 512 
defects. Similarly, the upper limit for validity of the BGDGFM is 16.4 mm. 513 
6.5. The Applicability of the Failure Models to Typical Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines 514 
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The minimum required wall thicknesses determined in Section 6.1 are now compared with 515 
the upper limits of applicability of the NG-18 Equations and BGDGFM. Figures 5 and 6 show 516 
the minimum required wall thickness for three grades of pipe across a range of design factors 517 
for pipelines with diameters of 610 mm (24 ‘’) and 914 mm (36 ‘’) respectively. 518 
Figure 5: Minimum required wall thicknesses for CO2 pipeline with diameter of 610 mm (24 519 
‘’) 520 
 521 
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Figure 6: Minimum required wall thicknesses for CO2 pipeline with diameter of 914 mm 522 
(36‘’) 523 
On the basis of this analysis, the minimum required CO2 pipeline wall thickness, under 150 524 
barg operational pressure, may be between 12.5 mm and 63 mm depending on pipe 525 
diameter, material and design factor used. It is noted that in 13 of the 18 cases considered, 526 
the minimum required wall thickness for CO2 pipelines exceeds 21.9 mm. For the 610 mm 527 
(24‘’) diameter pipelines, there are about half cases (5 out of the 9 cases) with the minimum 528 
required wall thickness greater than 21.9 mm while for 914 mm (36’’) diameter pipelines 529 
there is only one case out of the 9 cases with the minimum required wall thickness less than 530 
21.9 mm. This means that in the majority of cases, the required minimum CO2 pipeline wall 531 
thickness is outside of the known ranges of applicability of the NG-18 equations and the 532 
BGDGFM. In other words, in the majority of cases, current failure frequency models cannot 533 
be used to reliably estimate the failure frequency of dense phase CO2 pipelines. 534 
7. The Applicability of Historical Operational Data to Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines 535 
The historical operational data used in the existing failure frequency models originates from 536 
either the UKOPA Fault Database or its predecessor the ERS Fault Database. Currently this is 537 
the only pipeline fault database which provides sufficient information from which cumulative 538 
probability distributions and incident rates suitable for a failure frequency model based on 539 
structural reliability methods can be derived. 540 
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In order to apply the existing failure frequency models to dense phase CO2 pipelines, the most 541 
appropriate historical operational data to use would ideally originate only from operational 542 
dense phase CO2 pipelines in the UK. More specifically, the data would concern dense phase 543 
CO2 pipelines with wall thicknesses covering the full range over which the model could 544 
potentially be applied. However, since there are currently no dense phase CO2 pipelines 545 
operating in the UK and therefore no historical operational data regarding them, a 546 
compromise must be made. Given the principles of containment, stress and fracture, and that 547 
all high-pressure pipelines are constructed using steel linepipe, third party external 548 
interference failure frequency is not sensitive to the product that a pipeline transports. The 549 
most recent UKOPA Fault Database may therefore be the most appropriate source of 550 
historical operational data to use in order to calculate the failure frequency for dense phase 551 
CO2 pipelines. 552 
It is noted that the wall thicknesses contained in the UKOPA Fault Database are limited by 553 
operational pipelines. Since there are no onshore dense phase CO2 pipelines currently in 554 
operation, it is not yet known whether the database contains data covering the required wall 555 
thickness range. At present there is no solution to this problem, however the future 556 
construction and operation of dense phase CO2 pipelines will ensure the data source becomes 557 
more relevant with time. 558 
8. Discussion of the Applicability of Existing Failure Frequency Models to CO2 Pipelines 559 
The review of the failure equations used in existing failure frequency models showed that 560 
they are all based on both the NG-18 equations for the failure of gouges and leak/rupture 561 
behaviour and the BGDGFM for the failure of a gouged dent. It was concluded that the largest 562 
wall thickness in the experimental tests used to derive the NG-18 equations was 21.9 mm for 563 
the through-wall equations and 15.6 mm for the part-wall equations. Similarly, 16.4 mm is 564 
the maximum wall thickness used to derive the BGDGFM. In terms of the UKOPA database, 565 
which contains details of faults and failures which have previously affected operating onshore 566 
pipelines in the UK, the largest wall thickness is 19.1 mm. In the majority of the design studies 567 
illustrated in this paper, the minimum wall thickness for dense phase CO2 pipelines must be 568 
greater than 21.9 mm. Therefore, based on the results of this paper, it is concluded that 569 
current failure frequency models for third party external interference may not be suitable for 570 
dense phase CO2 pipelines due to their typical design requirements. Further work needs to be 571 
conducted to confirm the most appropriate approach for calculating failure frequency for 572 
dense phase CO2 pipelines.  573 
9. Conclusions 574 
For oil and natural gas pipelines, the frequency of pipeline failure due to third party external 575 
interference is calculated using models based upon structural reliability methods. These 576 
models combine semi-empirical pipeline failure equations with probability distributions 577 
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derived from historical operational damage data. A review of the available failure frequency 578 
models was performed in order to assess their applicability to dense phase CO2 pipelines.  579 
It was shown that the high design pressure requirement for a dense phase CO2 pipeline 580 
typically necessitates the use of high wall thickness linepipe in pipeline construction.  581 
It is concluded that the applicability of the existing failure frequency models to typical dense 582 
phase CO2 pipelines may be beyond the known range of applicability for the pipeline failure 583 
equations used within existing failure frequency models due to the high wall thickness 584 
linepipe requirements of typical CO2 pipelines. 585 
Furthermore, even though third party external interference failure frequency is not sensitive 586 
to the product that a pipeline transports, there is however a limitation to the UKOPA Fault 587 
Database with regards to its application to CO2 pipelines because there are currently no dense 588 
phase CO2 pipelines operating in the UK. 589 
Further work needs to be conducted to confirm the most appropriate approach for calculating 590 
failure frequency for dense phase CO2 pipelines. It is recommended that a new failure 591 
frequency model suitable for dense phase CO2 pipelines is developed that is applicable to 592 
thick wall linepipe and can be readily updated to the latest version of the UKOPA Fault 593 
database. As part of this, a definitive assessment as to the applicability of the NG-18 equations 594 
and BGDGFM to thick wall dense phase CO2 pipelines is needed. Examples of demonstrating 595 
applicability include conducting a detailed numerical analysis including finite element analysis 596 
or an experimental test programme. 597 
10. Acknowledgements  598 
This work has been conducted under the auspices of the National Grid COOLTRANS research 599 
programme and the authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of National Grid for 600 
this research. 601 
References 602 
BSI, 2013. 'BS PD 8010: Part-3:2009, PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013', in Pipeline systems - Part 3: 603 
Steel pipelines on land - Guide to the Application of Pipeline Risk Assessment to Proposed 604 
Developments in the Vicinity of Major Accident Hazard Pipelines Containing Flammables. 31st 605 
July 2013. British Standards Institution. 606 
BSI, 2015. 'BS PD 8010: Part-1:2015+A1:2016' Pipeline systems. Steel pipelines on land. Code 607 
of practice. March 2015. British Standards Institution. 608 
Cooper, R. and Barnett, J., 2014a. The COOLTRANS Research Programme: Learning for the 609 
Design of CO2 Pipelines. 10th International Pipeline Conference. Paper No. IPC2014-33370. 610 
23 
 
Cooper, R., Barnett, J., 2014b. Pipelines for Transporting CO2 in the UK, 12th International 611 
Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, GHGT-12. 2013. pp. 2412 - 2431. 612 
Corder, I., 1985a. Hazard Analysis of The Transmission System - External Interference (Dent 613 
and Gouge) (ERS R.3244). 614 
Corder, I., 1985b. Hazard Analysis of The Transmission System - External Interference 615 
(Gouging) (ERS R.3015). 616 
Corder, I., 1986. Hazard Analysis of Transmission System - External Interference (ERS R.3245). 617 
Corder, I., 1993. A Users Guide to The Pipeline Failure Frequency Program FFREQ (ERS 618 
R.5004). 619 
Corder, I., 1995. The Application of Risk Techniques to The Design and Operation of Pipelines 620 
(C502/016/95). 621 
Cosham, A., 2001. Assessment Methods for Dents and Gouges in Pipelines 622 
(NR99015/4238.1.75/R3). 623 
Cosham, A., 2002. Assessment Methods for Gouges in Pipelines (NR99013/4238.1.73/R3). 624 
Cosham, A., 2007. Reduction Factors for Damage due to External Interference (UKOPA/01-625 
N/BR07084/1). 626 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017. The Clean Growth Strategy 627 
Leading the way to a low carbon future, HM Government, Crown copyright. 628 
Downie, M.J., Race, J.M., Seevam, P.N., 2007. 'SPE 109060: Transport of CO2 for Carbon 629 
Capture and Storage in the UK, Offshore Europe 2007. Aberdeen, Scotland, UK, 4-7th 630 
September 2007. SPE International. 631 
Dugdale, D.S., 1960. Yielding of Steel Sheets Containing Slits, Journal of the Mechanics and 632 
Physics of Solids, 8, pp. 100 – 104. 633 
Goodfellow, G., Haswell, J., 2006. IPC2006-10507: A Comparison of Inherent Risk Levels in 634 
ASME B31.8 and UK Gas Pipeline Design Codes, 6th International Pipeline Conference. 635 
Calgary, Alberta, Canada, September 25-29th, 2006. 636 
Goodfellow, G., Turner, S., Haswell, J., Espiner, R., 2012. IPC2012-90247: An Update to the 637 
UKOPA Pipeline Damage Distributions, 9th International Pipeline Conference. Calgary, 638 
Alberta, Canada, September 24-28th 2012. 639 
Haswell, J.V., Lyons, C., 2008. Failure Frequency Predictions due to 3rd Party Interference for 640 
Corrib Pipeline (PIE/07/R0176). 641 
24 
 
Hopkins, P., 1992. The Application of Fitness for Purpose Methods to Defects Detected in 642 
Offshore Transmission Pipelines, Conference on Welding and Weld Performance in the 643 
Process Industry, London. 644 
HSE, 2003. Planning Case Assessment Support (PCAS) Chapter 6O: PIPIN Pipeline Failure 645 
Frequency Software. 646 
HSE, 2008. Pipeline design codes and standards for use in UK CO2 Storage and Sequestration 647 
projects. 648 
IGEM/TD/2, 2008. Application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the 649 
vicinity of high pressure natural gas pipelines, Institute of Gas Engineers and Managers 650 
(IGEM). 651 
Kiefner, J.F., Maxey, W.A., Eiber, R.J., and Duffy, A.R., 1973. The Failure Stress Levels of Flaws 652 
in Pressurised Cylinders, ASTM STP 536, American Society for Testing and Materials, 653 
Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 461-481. 654 
Koornneef, J., et al, 2009. Uncertainties in risk assessment of CO2 pipelines. 9th International 655 
Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, GHGT-9. Washington DC. 656 
Knoope, M.M.J., Raben, I.M.E., Ramírez, A., Spruijt, M.P.N., Faaij, A.P.C., 2014. The influence 657 
of risk mitigation measures on the risks, costs and routing of CO2 pipelines, International 658 
Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, October 2014, Vol.29, pp.104-124. 659 
Lyons, C., 2006. Failure Frequency Prediction for Pipelines Due to 3rd Party Interference 660 
(PIE/2006/R121). 661 
Lyons, C., Haswell, J.V., Hopkins, P., Ellis, R., Jackson, N., 2008. IPC2008-64375: A Methodology 662 
for The Prediction of Pipeline Failure Frequency Due to External Interference, 7th 663 
International Pipeline Conference. Calgary, Alberta, Canada, September 30th - October 3rd 664 
2008. 665 
Matthews, Z., Cairns, A., 1984. Statistical Treatment of Damage Information for The ERS 666 
Hazard Analysis Program (ERS R.3012). 667 
Milne, I., Ainsworth, R. A., Dowling, A. R. and Stewart, A. T., 1988. Assessment of the integrity 668 
of structures containing defects, Int J Pres Ves Piping, 32 3104. 669 
Molag, M. and Dam, C., 2011. Modelling of accidental releases from a high pressure CO2 670 
pipelines. 10th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies. 671 
Amsterdam. 672 
Noothout, P., Wiersma, F., Hurtado, O., Macdonald, D., Kemper,  J., van Alphen, K., 2014. CO2 673 
Pipeline infrastructure – lessons learnt Energy Procedia 63 (2014) 2481 – 2492. 674 
25 
 
Parfomak, P.W., Fogler, P., 2007. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Pipelines for Carbon Sequestration: 675 
Emerging Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. 676 
UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, The Clean Growth Strategy Leading 677 
the way to a low carbon future, 2017. 678 
Wetenhall, B. and Race, J. M. and Downie, M. J., 2014. The effect of CO2 purity on the 679 
development of pipeline networks for carbon capture and storage schemes. International 680 
Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 30, p. 197-211. 681 
White Rose, 2016. K29: Transport – Process Description, Technical Transport, 2016. 682 
